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Abstract — Mid 2010, the Stuxnet ICS attack targeted the 
Siemens automation products, and after this attack the ICS 
security was thrust into spotlight, automation products 
suppliers started to re-examine their business approach to cyber 
security. The OPC Foundation made also significant changes 
and improvements on its new design OPC-UA to increase 
security of automation applications but, what is still missing and 
seems to be not resolved any time soon is having security in 
depth for industrial automation applications. In this paper, we 
propose a simple but strong security control solution, what we 
will call a logic application level security particularly for 
SCADA and DCS. This proposed method is based on message 
integrity and should not be viewed as the main, nor the only level 
of protection that an industrial automation system is expected to 
have, but can be a low-level security procedure that avoids 
intelligent attacks such as Stuxnet. 
Keywords—Stuxnet, Obfuscation, Encryption, MAC, SCADA, 
DCS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The nation's critical infrastructures (CI) such as those 
found in Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA), Distributed Control Systems (DCS) and generally 
industrial control systems (ICS), are essential for day-to-day 
operation of the economy, security and government. These are 
ushered by insecure connectivity to traditional network. 
Electric power production and distribution, water treatment 
and supply, gas and oil production and distribution, nuclear 
plants, transportation systems, and telecommunication 
systems are excellent examples of CI. This paper is an 
extension of the work originally presented in conference 
ETFA 2016 [1]. 
Protecting and assuring the availability of CI is vital to the 
world economies. CI assets are often privately held and can 
cross international borders via industrial and non-industrial 
networks, for example The August 2003 northeast blackout, 
which also affected Canada, shows how CI crosses 
international boundaries [2]. On June 1999, at about 3:30 p.m. 
a 16‐inch‐diameter steel pipeline owned by The Olympic 
Pipe Line Company ruptured and released about 237,000 
gallons of gasoline into a creek that flowed through Whatcom 
Falls Park in Bellingham, Washington [3]. On April 23, 2000, 
Vitek Boden, a man who was successfully intruded into a 
Queensland, Australia wastewater management system 46 
times to cause damage, again in April of 2000 the 
“ILOVEYOU” virus rendered a petroleum refinery in Texas 
inoperable [4]. A December 2002 report from Mechanical 
Engineering cites examples of “wardriving” into SCADA-
controlled utilities [4]. In August 2003, a computer virus was 
blamed for bringing down train signalling systems throughout 
the eastern U.S. The signalling outage briefly affected the 
entire CSX system, which covers 23 states east of the 
Mississippi River [5]. In May 2004, coastguard stations 
around the UK were severely disrupted after a computer worm 
rough down IT systems. The Sasser worm hit all 19 
coastguard stations and the service's main headquarters, 
leaving staff reliant on paper maps and pens [5]. Mid 2010, 
the Stuxnet ICS attack targeted the Siemens automation 
products, and after this attack the ICS security was thrust into 
spotlight and all automation products suppliers started to re-
examine their business approach to cyber security, eliminates 
gaps previously viewed low risk and improve practice in 
general [6]. 
As can be seen from the previous examples, industrial 
control equipment is susceptible to computer-based attacks. It 
may therefore be concluded that computer-based equipment 
used in industrial automation needs to be protected against 
relevant attacks. The widely accepted approach to computer 
security is based on security in depth, meaning that the 
computer system is viewed as a layered structure and security 
is introduced at each of the layers. With this approach, even if 
an attacker manages to penetrate the defenses of the outer 
layer, that attacker does not have automatic access to all 
devices inside the network as each device will itself include 
an additional layer of security protections. 
The rest of paper is structured as following. In Section II a 
short introduction to IC and PLC is provided. The IEC 61131-
3 standard is introduced in section III. Section IV in depth 
analyzes the Stuxnet virus. All related to security standards 
information is in detail presented in section V. The proposed 
approach is well presented and documented in Section VI. 
Finally, Section VII concludes our work. 
II. INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS AND PROGRAMMABLE 
LOGIC CONTROLLERS 
The basic operation of an ICS is shown in Fig.  1. The ICS 
is a general term for several types of control systems, that 
includes SCADA, DCS and other control system 
 
Fig. 1. The Industrial Control System operation in a general overview 
configurations such as Programmable Logic Controllers 
(PLC). 
The PLC was originally designed for small size factory 
automations, commonly referred to the “brain” of a factory, 
which did employ one or more machines with fair amount of 
the material transferred in line of the product. In such 
environment, a PLC must receive data from sensors and 
machines to control functionality and allow to operator 
visually monitor the product as they moved through the 
manufacturing line. Such manufacturing process has been 
very intensive logic control oriented with mostly high-speed 
requirements. 
PLC devices are loaded with blocks of code and data 
written using a variety of languages, such IEC 61131-3 or IEC 
61499. To make a PLC device functional it needs to be 
configured and programed through one of the above languages 
and usually a Windows computer based system called Control 
PC [6]. Once the PLC has been configured and programmed, 
the Control PC can be disconnected, and the PLC will function 
by itself. 
Control loop is the most important part of DCS and 
SCADA that usually use one or more than one advanced PLC 
with a memory, processor, and network, Real-Time Operating 
System (RTOS) or Embedded Operating System (EOS). 
Control algorithms and logic which knowns by logic 
application or control logic, is typically written by an engineer 
using an engineering workstation that is distinct from the PLC, 
and once compiled logic applications are downloaded to the 
PLCs where they will run (Fig. 2). Control programs are 
commonly written using one or more of the programming 
languages defined in the IEC 61131-3 international standard. 
However, recently the IEC 61499 standard come in spotlight 
but still majority of industries have designed based on IEC 
61131-3. To obtain security, both the engineering workstation 
as well as the PLC itself must be made secure. 
III. THE IEC-61131 STANDARD 
The IEC 61131 standard standardizes the behavior of PLC 
systems. It is built out of several parts, which cover both the 
PLC hardware as well as the programming system. More 
specifically, part 3 of this standard (more commonly known 
as IEC 61131-3) defines the common concepts used in PLC 
programming as well as additional new programming 
methods. IEC 61131-3 sees itself as a guideline for PLC 
programming, not as a rigid set of rules. 
The IEC 61131-3 standard focuses on the PLC 
programming languages, and how these programs should be 
interpreted and executed. It introduced five languages, which 
can be categorized into two parts: text based languages (IL - 
Instruction List, and ST -Structured Text) and graphical 
languages (LD - Ladder Diagram, FBD - Function Block 
Diagram, and SFC - Sequential Function Chart). Also, there is 
a possibility to use C language as a hosted function block 
inside of ST or FBD, which we call C function or C code and 
as we will see in the solution part of our paper to implement 
our idea to have an authentication protocol inside of IEC 
61131-3 languages. [15] The important note is that, more than 
90% of control logics around the world are developed based 
on this family which bring that to the spotlight [9]. 
IV. STUXNET VIRUS 
The term computer virus was coined by Fred Cohen in 
1985 [8]. But the new generation of viruses, particularly those 
ones is designed to attack the cyber-physical systems has so 
different behaviours than classical definitions. For example, 
viruses like Stuxnet, Duqu, and Flame were designed to steal 
information from industry or change the behaviour of control 
system by infecting the control logic and finally effecting on 
the main strategies of targeted organizations like the examples 
in the introduction. Such viruses, usually have a clear strategy. 
They want to be hidden. Therefore, they need to avoid any 
physical snap destructive behaviours, at least not until the end 
of the mission. However, the following explanation scenario 
is only speculation driven by the technical features of Stuxnet 
but it illustrates the above facts about the new generation of 
viruses which are going to target emerging technologies in the 
future of industrial automation particularly Industry 4.0 [6].  
Once Stuxnet had infected a computer within the 
organization it aims at finding the Control PC (the PC has 
running WinCC/STEP7 application), which are typical 
Windows based computers with a data cable connection 
directly to a PLC to program, set configuration, define 
networks or configure I/O channels etc. Since most of these 
computers are non-networked, Stuxnet would first try to 
spread to other computers on the LAN through the zero-day 
vulnerabilities, two-year-old vulnerabilities etc. to come 
inside of the organization. Then, the virus tries to find the 
targeted computer through the removable drives. Stuxnet’s 
goal was infecting specific type of PLC devices. 
When Stuxnet finally found a suitable computer (through 
identifying “.tmp”, “.s7p” or “.mcp” files), it would then 
replace the s7otbxdx.dll file to bug the communication 
between the Control PC and the connected PLCs. From this 
 
Fig. 2. Abstract respresentation of a distributed control system topology. 
 
Fig. 3. Stuxnet can modify the ST code before downloading to the PLC 
by the bugged version of s7otbxdx.dll. 
moment, the Stuxnet will be able to access the developed 
control loop logic on STEP7 software before downloading to 
the PLCs [6]. Fig. 3 shows that how Stuxnet can change the 
control loop logic before downloading time. 
A. The Infection Process 
The Stuxnet infects PLC through the code blocks and data 
blocks that will be injected into the PLC to alter it is behavior. 
The most common types of blocks are, Data Blocks (DB) 
contain program specification data types, System Data Blocks 
(SDB), contain configuration of the PLC. Organization 
Blocks (OB) or Program Organization Unit (POU based on 
the IEC 61131-3 standard terminology, which are the entry 
point of programs) and CPU cyclically executes them. Finally, 
Function Blocks (FB) which are standard code blocks. 
Then, starts to attack the SDBs in order to find a DWORD 
at offset 50h equal to 0100CB2Ch [6]. This specifies the 
system uses the Profibus communications processor module 
namely CP 342-5 for SIMATIC S7-300 series [10]. Profibus 
is a standard industrial network bus used for distributed I/O. 
The result of this attack is to replace the original DP_RECV 
which is a standard function block used to receive networks 
frames on the Profibus by a malicious one. This way the 
malicious Stuxnet block takes control and can-do post 
processing on the packet data. Then, next step is to use a code-
prepending infection technique to infect Organization Blocks. 
Stuxnet writes malicious code to the beginning of OB1 
after increasing the size of original block to execute malicious 
code at the start of a cycle. Stuxnet also infects OB35 to create 
a watchdog functionality and then based on the values found 
in these blocks, other packets are generated and sent on the 
wire. From the above description about the Stuxnet 
functionality we can extract the following facts. The first fact 
is that Stuxnet or any other virus to attack needs access to 
communication protocols and as well as to the control logic 
application. The second fact is that they also need some clues 
about the technical structure of the targeted system. 
Now the question is how we can protect a PLC based 
system against of virus. The following section is a brief 
overview on the relevant security standards but as we will see 
at the end none of them touch the PLC level to provide a 
security solution. 
V. RELEVANT SECURITY STANDARDS 
Every secured computer system must require all users to 
be authenticated at login time. After all, if the operating 
system cannot be sure who the user is, it cannot know which 
files and other resources the user can access. While 
authentication may sound like a trivial topic, it is a bit more 
complicated than you might expect [11]. In the case of PLC 
based systems there is no IT security for logic application 
(control loop) level as well as for I/O level which exists in 
regular PC, thus the downloaded logic application on PLC is 
always running without any privileging, authentication, or 
security validation process. This means that, the execution of 
each instruction may raise security deficiencies and cause 
critical issues. However, there are several standards [3], [8], 
[12]–[16] that provides a set of rules and procedures to make 
control systems more secure but none of them touches on the 
security at the logic application level.  
Security standards generally specify what must be done or 
achieved but not how to go about doing it. In this section, a 
very brief overview of the most important industrial control 
security systems is provided. One aspect that is common 
among all standards is that all of assumed PLCs are in low 
component compatible level [3], [8], [12]–[16], so they put 
PLCs out of the security standards scope or at least if they have 
procedure, is just in operating system level not in application 
(control logic) level, which makes PLCs more treatable.  
ISO/IEC 27001:2005 - ISO/IEC 27002:2005 is addressed 
in all Industries.  IEC 62351:2007 addressed data and 
communications security and used information security for 
power system control operations.   
IEC 62210:2003 addressed power system control and 
associated communications - data and communication 
security electrical distribution. This standard applies to 
computerized supervision, control, metering, and protection 
systems in electrical utilities. It deals with security aspects 
related to communication protocols used within and between 
such systems and, the access to use of the systems. IEC TC 65 
WG 10 IEC/PAS 62443-3-1:2008, addressed by the Electrical 
distribution/transportation ISA99. 
There is an agreement between ISA and IEC by which 
ANSI/ISA99 standards will form the base documents for the 
IEC 62443 series. The U.S. Information Technology 
Laboratory published a guide to Industrial Control Systems 
(ICS) Security Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCS), and 
other control system configurations such as Programmable 
Logic Controllers (PLC) in 2008 but, even inside of this 
document there is no procedure for PLC code (logic 
application) level security [8]. 
VI. SECURE COMMUNICATION PLATFORM BETWEEN 
CONTROL PC – PLC AND I/O 
Our solution has two parts. In the first part, the 
communication link between Control PC and PLC devices 
must be secured by using a relevant solution like Massage 
Authentication Code, however, the other extensions of MAC 
like UMAC will have better functionality in this scope due to 
distributed nature of these systems. For example, a Control PC 
can program and configure at the same time more than one 
PLC so using a multicast authentication protocol can have 
better effect than single iterative MAC based solution.  
Then, in the second part, the I/O communication structure 
between PLC and sensors/actuators must be secured by our 
proposed FPGA based solution or by [17] however, as we will 
see at the end our solution has less overhead.  
Finally, in this way we can make a control system end-to-
end secure and well protected against any attack from the 
outside/inside of the control network. However, this needs a 
hard and complex validations process to make sure that is 
really functional. This implies that to carry on our idea in the 
scope of paper we must make some basic assumptions such as 
use of OT (operational technology) based systems.  
A. Part I: Message Authentication Code 
Message Authentication Code (MAC) is a method of 
providing assurance of message authenticity, with the 
additional benefit of also guaranteeing message integrity [18]. 
It consists on the sender generating a message key from the 
message itself (for example, by using a hash algorithm to 
generate a hash of the message). This key is then 
cryptographically encoded using a cryptographic algorithm 
and an encryption key. The resulting encrypted hash value 
(also called the MAC) is added to the message and sent to the 
receiver. 
The receiver verifies the integrity and authenticity of the 
message by sending the message and the MAC code to a 
verification algorithm. A trivial solution for the verification 
algorithm consists on repeating the operations done by the 
sender and checking whether the two MACs match. Many 
triplets of the three (hashing, encryption, verification) 
algorithms may be used. Ideally efficient algorithms are 
chosen that reduce either the computation time, or the message 
overhead introduced by the MAC.  
1) Universal Message Authentication Code 
Universal Message Authentication Code (UMAC) was 
designed to achieve two main goals, extreme speed and 
provable security [19]. UMAC works based on dividing the 
message into m blocks, which allows the hashing and 
encryption algorithms to be applied to each block 
independently, and therefore exploiting the capabilities of 
Single Instruction, Multiple Data (SIMD) parallelism based 
CPUs. The sender should provide for the receiver the 
message, nonce, and tag, then the receiver can compute what 
should be the tag for this particular message and nonce, and 
see if it matches the received tag (Fig. 4). 
2) Real Time Multicast Authentication Protocols 
BIBA is a broadcast authentication protocol that takes the 
first approach, and proposes a one-time signature and 
broadcast authentication protocol, without trapdoors and 
relatively small signature [20]. Another method proposed by 
Reyzin [26] also uses a one-time signature, but manages to be 
faster than BIBA and has a slightly lower communication 
overhead. However, both methods are unsuitable for real-time 
applications due to their still considerable communication 
overhead. The second approach, which consists of amortizing 
the signature over several packets, has been adopted by Wong 
and Lam. This method suffers from high computation and 
communication overheads. Another protocol, known as 
TESLA has low computation overhead and low per-packet 
communication overhead, but does not consider packet loss 
rate, requires time synchronization between the sender and the 
receiver in order to satisfy the security condition, and the 
sending rate must be slower than the network delay from the 
sender to the receiver. There is another protocol designed by 
Ritesh Mukherjee [27], this protocol proposed the symmetric 
message authentication scheme, which is based on symmetric 
MAC. This protocol consumes large computation overhead. 
The receiver needs to calculate the MAC of the cipher, make 
a comparison operation, make a decryption operation, and 
make another comparison, which may not be practical in case 
of real time applications. 
Finally, there is an another new protocol proposed in [21], 
[22] by R.Abdellatif, H.K. Aslan, and S.H. Elramly (LAR), 
which provides authentication but after using of erasure code 
function that also provides a solution to avoid packet losing 
problem. It uses both public key signature and symmetric key 
functions. It is based on the idea of dividing the stream into 
blocks of m packets. The sender applies the digital signature 
on the group key kg and the digital signature is done by any 
public key system like RSA [20]. The output of the erasure 
code function is partitioned into m symbols: {S1, S2, …, Sm}. 
LAR avoids the problem of signature loss and sending the 
signature more than one time and also has a resistance to 
packet loss as long as it is below a certain loss rate R. The 
LAR protocol overcomes the pollution attack problem as well 
as introducing less communication overhead compared to the 
other protocols used in real time applications. R.Abdellatif 
made LAR solution even more optimum by processing the 
protocol as a serial instead of parallel so the complexity of the 
protocol decreased with less communication overhead by 
about 2 bytes. 
B. Part II: Handling based on FPGA Hashing 
Industrial Control Systems, must be connected to physical 
environments through I/O equipment such as Digital I/O 
devices, Analog I/O devices etc. In fact, Digital input, and 
output modules (I/O modules) are key elements of every PLC. 
Nowadays, Field Programming Gate Array (FPGA) is a well-
known solution to design and program such I/O devices [23], 
[24]. They are easy to use and fixable to merge software and 
hardware technical concepts. The following section is a 
representation of MD5 hashing algorithm on FPGA. In this 
work, we will use a specific type of FPGA from Xilinix 
products but, this hashing algorithm can be implemented in 
any type of FPGA. Fig. 5 shows a block diagram of MD5 on 
FPGA. 
In [17] they used an auxiliary processor to implement  
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) an 
efficient and secure crypto-algorithm technology [25]. An 
optimal ECDSA implementation will use public key-based 
security and a certificate infrastructure along with a digital 
signature to the authentication process between a PLC and I/O 
card. 
ECDSA involves elliptic curve operations over finite 
fields, which is a mathematically intensive operation to 
implement. While the authenticator IC settle on the I/O card, 
the PLC must also be able to compute a digital signature. This  
capability increases the complexity of problem for the PLC’s 
host microcontroller. For that in the work [17] they used a 
coprocessor to overcome this overhead.  
But, the problem of the proposed in [17] solution is that 
the integrity of different modules with each other from 
different vendors is usually hard or sometimes impossible 
work. Some companies have already they own products with 
a PLC from other vendors and I/O modules from their own 
production line and having a solution based on FPGA can help 
them to add security layer with minimum cost. The other 
problem of that solution is the complexity and overhead which 
implies to use an auxiliary processor. As you can see in our 
solution we proposed a built in FPGA data structure and a 
hashing functionality to map the physical addresses with their 
hashed values and create a secured lookup table for PLC I/O 
 
Fig. 4. Universal message authentication code. 
channels (Fig. 6). PLC will have a serial connection with 
FPGA and the only fields that will be transferred between PLC 
and FGPA are Value, Offset and Time-stamp. Since PLC has 
already a mapped list from physical I/O lists to their hashed 
values then it will have a grant access to each value and its 
related signal. The way of processing each signal from I/O and 
RTDB has been discussed in [1].  
VII. CONCLUTIONS 
We used FPGA to build our I/O device and implement 
hardware version of MAC encryption with a lookup table to 
protect signals right after being harvested from the plant. We 
provide an identical signature per peer of signal tag and value 
before transferring to the PLC level and also we do integrity 
test right after receiving a signal from the PLC. This will allow 
us to make sure about the validity of each signal value before 
injecting in the control loop and writing back on the output 
channel. In another word our solution protected the PLC – I/O 
– PLC part of control system with a very low computation 
overhead.  
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Fig. 5. Block Diagram of MD iterative design. 
 
Fig. 6. The I/O lists data structure and MD5 hashing algorithm that used 
to hash offset.
